by Frank James
It wasn't a surprise that Washington Mutual, better known as WaMu, failed. For months It's been the thrift institution equivalent of a dead-man walking, finally being put to death by a run by its depositors, making it the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
Still, the timing of its demise, coming when it did at the very time Congress and the White House were trying to reach agreement on a Wall Street bailout, was like a thunder clap coming from the economic storm clouds hanging over the nation's capital.
Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan Chase was one of the few financial companies left standing with a strong enough balance sheet to do such a deal.
One of the best parts of the deal is it won't eat into Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. funds, which, if as many banks fail as is expected, will likely have to be replenished.
The Wall Street Journal does its typically comprehensive job of covering the story giving a lot a space to what the deal means for JP Morgan Chase. (In a nutshell, it should be very good for the Wall Street firm, permitting it, among other things, to expand into two markets it's lusted after -- California and Florida.)
An interesting bit of color from the story is this: The WaMu chief executive, only in the role 16 days, was in New York as he tried to find a buyer for the thrift institution and was on his way back to the West Coast when the Office of Thrift Supervision took his company over. He had no idea.
Here's an excerpt:
WaMu, founded in 1889, became a national mortgage- and consumer-lending giant via a string of mergers in the 1990s led by Chief Executive Officer Kerry Killinger. But Mr. Killinger made several missteps. He pursued an aggressive retail expansion marred by poor locations in too many markets. He steered WaMu into subprime mortgages, only to discover too late that the thrift was lending to many unqualified borrowers.
This year the company laid off employees, closed mortgage centers and cut its dividend.
But it still posted a $3.3 billion second-quarter loss and said it expected to lose $19 billion on its mortgage portfolio over the next two and a half years. WaMu's biggest predicament was that it held large amounts of mortgages made in U.S. regions where housing prices have fallen sharply, such as California. WaMu has $53 billion in option adjustable-rate mortgages, a type of loan particularly vulnerable to default, as well as $16.1 billion in loans made to subprime borrowers.
